

Cultural Policy Yearbook
2017-2018

Cultural Policy and Populism

**The Rise of Populism
and the Crisis of Political Pragmatism**



Cultural Policy Yearbook 2017-2018
Cultural Policy and Management Research Centre (KPY)

CULTURAL POLICY AND POPULISM
The Rise of Populism and the Crisis of Political Pragmatism

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Foreword

Serhan Ada

In this new issue covering two years (2017-2018), the Yearbook features a Focus section that takes an in-depth look at a phenomenon that has rapidly become globalized over a very short time: Populism. There is no need to add that this phenomenon, which also imposes a revision of the basic assumptions of cultural policy, seriously shakes culture's characteristic of being the common property of the public, and renders it altogether debatable. The articles in the Focus section analyze the effects of rising populism on cultural policy over a broad scope extending from the Balkans to South America and based on cases taken from practice, while some articles explore how it is that populism itself managed to find suitable grounds in the first quarter of the 21st century and spread in a different way than we ever knew before. All these developments require that the concepts and 'truths' regarded as canon in cultural policy be reformulated. On behalf of KPY, I would like to thank our editors Milena Dragičević Šešić and Jonathan Vickery who not only got this comprehensive Focus section ready for publication in a short time but also wrote a mind-stimulating Introduction.

I would also like to extend my gratitude to my colleagues and friends Gökçe Dervişoğlu Okandan, Funda Lena, and Adil Serhan Şahin for their valuable editorial contributions in the Open Space and Review sections, thanks to which we were able to include in this issue the latest developments in the field of cultural policy and management.

The publication of this issue of the Yearbook came alongside two major novelties.

The first is that, from now on, through an agreement between Istanbul Bilgi University and İletisim Publishing, the Yearbook will be published and distributed by İletisim Publishing (under the title *Cultural Policy Yearbook*). This novel solution is worth mentioning at length, as it represents the collaboration between the university and the cultural sector at a time when cultural industries are going through a difficult period. The second novelty is the new academic initiative which was added at the end of 2017 to the critical mass within Istanbul Bilgi University (BILGI) and which includes the KPY - Cultural Policy and Management Research Center (namely, the Department of Arts and Cultural Management, which offers undergraduate education, and the Arts and Cultural Management and Management of Performing Arts Programs under it, as well as the minor in Performing Arts, and the graduate program in Cultural Management). This new initiative is the UNESCO Chair in Cultural Policy and Cultural Diplomacy, which will be officially launched at the start of the 2018-2019 academic year during an international conference. Through research and collaborations, both at the national and international level, the UNESCO Chair will add a new dimension to BILGI's pioneering work in the field of culture and art.

FOCUS

EDITORS Milena Dragićević Šešić - Jonathan Vickery

OPEN SPACE

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REVIEW

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Introduction

Jonathan Vickery - Milena Dragičević Šešić

The concept of this Yearbook's Focus section has been evolving through a range of symposia, debates and an increasing awareness of a changing political landscape in Europe over the past two years. New populist leaders beyond Europe –from Donald Trump to Vladimir Putin and the Philippines' Rodrigo Duterte, to name a few– have provided a vivid backdrop for the extraordinary rise of lesser known populist leaders in Europe. Altogether, they exhibit a disturbing level of unpredictability as much as individuality. They are disturbing not simply because of their manipulative charisma, demagoguery, intransigence, or the forms of political brutality we all recognise and are well-documented by the political research of populism throughout the Twentieth century. They are disturbing because they are increasingly using (and using up) the language of both classical democracy and critical anti-capitalism. It was presidential candidate Donald Trump who repudiated the role of corporate finance in US elections, attacked the social elites who dominate US society and culture, criticised the impact of foreign capital and corporate greed on the average worker, and made unemployment and the reduction in the rights of the common man central election themes. Yet for all their pioneering poise, the world's populist leaders are also symptomatic of a pervasive skepticism on power, authority, government and public bureaucracy, and to that extent they are symptomatic of trends intrinsic to global neoliberalism, which first emerged in the 1970s. Such trends include a heightened skepticism as to the validity and value of purely social (non-economic) value, specifically of public culture but also welfare-based institutions, and furthermore, an increasing concentration of power in an increasingly amoral and arbitrary State.

Why populism is so difficult to oppose, is its simultaneous re-statement of the rights of the common

man in the face of such pervasive skepticism, all the while supporting the dissolution of democratic institutional procedures on account of their ineffectiveness. For the European Left since the 1980s, culture and the arts were a vehicle for addressing skepticism on the effectiveness of collective social solidarity in the face of an increasing marketisation of social life, rising social inequity resulting from de-industrialisation, and the consequent social disenfranchisement of large segments of the traditional labouring class. Since then, a range of cultural policy responses to social imbalance and inequity have emerged, and to this day the phrases (in English) “social inclusion”, “access” and “participation” have become stock-in-trade strategic aims of so many arts organisations in receipt of public funds. Since the 1980s (arguably pioneered by France), cultural policy has been a central vehicle for what may be called “symbolic democratisation” – the use of arts and culture as a means of expressing the legitimacy of the State in its commitment to equity and recognition, displaying the nation state's patrimony in forms that articulate a “belonging” to “the people” en masse (and the generality of the en masse, as the “general” public, was a tacit means of signaling how everyone, whatever their ethnic origin, was included). However, at some point, the generality of the “en masse” has ceased to have a political function, and the perceived loss of this sense of collective cohesiveness, and its consequences for democracy, is something populism feeds on (and indeed does so by activating a sense of nostalgia, with a dimension of mythology on past forms of social cohesion and belonging).

The task of cultural policies in Europe has remained two-fold – to demonstrate the State's supposed Duty of Care for culture while communicating a sense of inclusion enfranchisement, suffrage and representation so crucial for the notion of democracy

to maintain credibility. This increasing politicisation of cultural policy since the 1980s has entailed two significant shifts: Firstly, cultural policy itself was extended from a relatively non-contentious set of public policies for the preservation and maintenance of institutions, cultural assets and professional expertise – to a means of generating certain forms of social benefit, education and cultural opportunities. Secondly, cultural policies were increasingly interconnected with other public policies – predictably social policies (and also policies for local economy and urban development).

This has, in time, entailed increasing levels of governmental scrutiny of the effectiveness and functioning of the roles, impacts and outcomes of cultural activity (from heritage to publicly funded arts, but also the creative industries particularly where they play a role in urban development). Cultural policy makers, cultural leaders and senior practitioners all over Europe, have successfully adapted themselves to increased demands for information and data, through reporting and measurement, as justification for the use of public funds but also evidence of cultural value. There are few cultural sectors that present a specific and concerted challenge to the State quite the contrary, culture delivers consistent value for economy and society. Yet, with few exceptions, cultural workers rarely feel secure.

There were many ways in which the political and consequent bureaucratic interest in measuring or assessing culture was entirely reasonable in articulating the demands of democracy for public scrutiny, transparency and accountability. And years of political pragmatism in the face of the demands of politicians, public bureaucracies and the popular press, have inculcated in European cultural sectors an acceptance of the political scrutiny and evaluation of culture, as of “evidence-based policy making” (which often masks an inevitable political epistemology of policy-based evidence making). More complicated is the fate of “public” or the “common” dimension of culture. It is a truism that modern democracy aims above all for the “public interest”. Yet, democracies are forever caught in the paradox that the democratic “public”, while the source of democracy’s legitimisation, are constituted only by virtue of the State. And it is the State’s closer and closer identification of its own authority with the “public interest” where the chronic contradictions of populism become manifest.

And, moreover, it is where the policy making enterprise for culture and the arts begin to oscillate in status between a position of intolerable scrutiny and of State neglect.

A primary theme of Focus, is the way populism is endemic in any political project appealing to mass allegiance, an originary identity or authentic expression of the nation state, the general public or a holistic social inclusiveness. In other words, it can emerge on either Left or Right of the political spectrum. It is difficult to define populism in a generic sense – as, for instance, party alliance or ideology. It is more accurately defined as a strategic identification of the “public” with State (and through this, an identification of State with a leader or party who interests are simultaneously identified with “the people”). Populism is essentially an appeal to “the people” on behalf of the people, that is, unmediated by institutions and procedures (which are deemed corrupt or elitist, and hence populists prefer direct communication with the people, like public gatherings or social media). The political Right’s concept of the “people” appeal to history, national identity and origins; the political Left tend to appeal to a more abstract concept of a social unity of diversity (or, if old fashioned socialist, the unrealised international solidarity).

Culture and the arts find themselves vulnerable in the face of populism insofar as they are inevitably associated with historical institutions, and are heavily mediated by a range of complex discourses, which in turn demand education, dialogue and a confrontation with forms of meaning not easily established (or made over into ideology). In one sense, culture and the arts make “demands” on a public in ways that position the State itself as part of a public realm, but also present requirements that are essentially intolerable to populists – for to fully understand and experience the arts and culture one is confronted by a requirement for historical and philosophical education, the capacity for theoretical reflection and intellectual debate, a self-confrontation with social norms and their embedded assumptions, and a willingness to experience a fundamental challenge to one’s sensory reflexes or experience of reality or the world. These are intolerable to those who require reality and the world to be instantly categorised by good or bad beliefs, or evaluated by inherited or customary measures (of authenticity, faithful,

loyal, and so on), or subject to political rationalisation and communicated as either supportive or a threat to the national or local interests of the people. And yet, culture and the arts are all too easily associated with the social elites, or dissenters, and the very political classes charged with exploitation and authoritarianism by the populists.

A secondary theme of Focus, is the political character of regulation, monitoring, assessment and the range of justifications now demanded by juries and public committees alike in their spending public money on culture and the arts. The new imperatives of “impacts” as measurable achievements only belies the limited (measurable) nature of the impacts desired. Where the arts once were expected to move beyond the known measurable world (traditionally, the preserve of science or scientifically informed public policies), they are now funded to the extent that they *reinforce this world* –and establish the value of already enforced normative horizons provided by governmental rationales. And these rationales effectively rationalise the incontestable, insofar as they aim for the good of the people– alleviating deprivation and poverty, providing education and employment, contributing to public health, and so forth. Contemporary cultural policies all across Europe have, by and large, responded to such demands with an accommodating political pragmatism – and how could they do otherwise? Yet, so many decades of increased political pragmatism is now being tested as the naked image of “the people” is becoming fully manifest in the global rise of populism. So if not to be “popular”, what do cultural policies aim for?

The political pragmatism of cultural policy can be defined in terms of two strategic assumptions: firstly, it is possible to support both cultural autonomy and an intrusive State scrutiny; and secondly, the public interest (in culture and the arts contributing to the common good) can always be separated from the instrumental manipulation of the State. In other words, whatever political complexion the State regime, it is often assumed (by arts professionals) that the arts can always transcend any positive function or affirmative relation to the State, and aim for the good and what is essentially beneficial to the citizen’s higher faculties, imagination and aesthetic aspirations. This is a romantic assumption, which remains attractive.

However seemingly necessary, romanticism is simultaneously a wilful naivety. In Europe it has argu-

ably generated an intellectual (as much as political) crisis. Cultural autonomy has become almost unintelligible: what does it mean for an arts organisation to remain outside society and economy? What is it, to be “autonomous” or play a pivotal role in the formation of an autonomous cultural realm? This question remains highly problematic, as all cultural organisation become increasingly dependent on cooperation with public policies (in a world of rising costs and place-based gentrification) – and their participation in the delivery mechanisms of governance and development has eclipsed their participation in a putative public sphere. As evidence of this, “cultural value” as a concept (now celebrated by the political elite) has become almost entirely abstracted from the very material and social conditions of cultural labour out of which it emerges. Hence its ever enduring mystery. Culture and the arts are now *given* roles in society –they do not make them or enforce them– and these roles involve perpetuating the same instrumental logic of corporate strategic management and neoliberal appropriation of the social and cultural lifeworld as the State. Whether building social capital through providing education, wellbeing or employment opportunities, or just providing a symbolic articulation of the salubrious leisure environments neoliberalism has made possible, cultural policies cannot be imagined other than a means of merely *contributing* to the aims of current State regimes.

Where cultural policies become a combination of humanistic fiction (art is good for your humanity and so on) and State capital (in supporting current models of socio-economic power), they become self-deceptive. By and large, the European cultural sector over the past twenty years has benefited from unprecedented public funds, growing indicators of “success”, rising visitor numbers and more media attention. MOMAs, MOCAs, biennales, city festivals of every kind, and the various ‘capital’ of culture accolades, the arts have never been so favourably received. Yet, in a world suffering appalling injustice and exploitation –of insecurity, spiralling costs, mental health crises, the privatisation of public assets, the commercialisation of public spaces, and where the principles of market retail are inserted into every area of public life– the cultural sector remains politically ineffective. If cultural sectors do maintain an impact on public values, the alternative political imagination, or the power of self-management in cultural

policy making, there is little evidence. It has hitherto had little power of resistance to the way cultural citizens have been turned into “audiences” and consumers, and cultural spaces mimic retail spaces in their promise of sensory pleasures. The now anachronistic longing for the mythic “Bilbao effect”, the spectacularity of the architectural image as signifier of professional credibility, and the necessary invocations of national greatness, all ring hollow in the face of an increasingly disenfranchised artistic community.

However, perhaps this viewpoint is unduly pessimistic: and indeed, one aim of this special issue is to scrutinise the realities of policy, populism and pragmatism in more detail. We have gathered a significant group of contributors, all of which are due our thanks for their intellectual perspicacity in bringing to bear these issues on the subjects of the arts, management and governance, public culture and the politics of public policy. The issue special section opens with Ayhan Kaya’s paper, ‘The Mainstreaming of Right-Wing Populism in Europe’, emerging out of a major EU Horizon 2020 Research Project, “Critical Heritages: performing and representing identities in Europe” (CoHERE). While offering a perceptive and detailed understanding of the way contemporary populism became “mainstream” in Europe, the paper forwards timely assessment on how far “the construction of a contemporary European identity is built in part on anti-Muslim racism”.

The theme of European identity is continued in Raphaela Henze’s contribution, ‘Eurocentrism in European Arts Management’. In part, grounded in an empirical study of 352 arts managers in 46 countries, the research is a persuasive overview of the dilemma globalisation and mass immigration poses for arts managers across the European continent. It concludes by challenging both our cognitive and practical understanding of social diversity, and proposes a more concerted engagement with the world and culture internationally. And next, Ana Žuvela and Dea Vidović address these issues as broad themes internal to the relation between cultural policy and democracy: How far do cultural policies in Europe facilitate democratic inclusion and participation? Characterising populism as a corruption of the democratic process, it nonetheless challenges the democratic practice of cultural policy-making to move beyond past understandings and templates of welfare provision, institutions and civil society (along with their instru-

mentalisation in favour of cultural democracy), and rather begin to learn from the “new spaces of socio-cultural interaction and production, the new generation of cultural centres attempt at activating public spaces” and the shift in cultural-political consciousness that they represent. Jonathan Vickery’s critical-historical representation of the UK’s pioneering New Labour government, focusses on the policy innovations between 1998-2004 and to some degree aims to define a very strong and enduring shift in cultural-political consciousness (indeed, many of the UK’s policies and management practices for the arts and creative industries are now used around the world). His paper, ‘Culture, Populism and the Public: New Labour’s early policy innovations and a paradigm-creation of a social instrumentalism’, aims to account for the homology between historical populism and the New Labour Left in their attempts to use the arts and culture for social and economic development (for the benefit of “society” and the people). The collapse in the political distinction between “the people” and “the public” is one theme of his analysis.

Opening the second stage of this section, playwright, activist and author, Mike van Graan, contributes a highly informed and critical account of the current function of arts and cultural policy in South Africa, against the backdrop of the past Apartheid era. It is perhaps an error to use the term “backdrop” to any account of the apartheid era, given how one achievement of the paper is to demonstrate how any attempt to understand the current conditions of development in South Africa (cultural, social, political) is impossible without a critical framing of recent history. Colonialism and oppression does not simply dissolve like a political regime, and the challenges for cultural policies –particularly in recognising and empowering artists and producers– point to huge problems with governance, intellectual and political. And from governance to government in a different region of the Global South, Lluís Bonet and Mariano Martín Zamorano perform an exacting comparative assessment of the cultural policies of two political regimes in Argentina, the administrations of PRO in the city of Buenos Aires (2007-17) and Kirchnerist Peronism in the central government (2003-15). The value of this paper is, in part, its exposition of how political ventures Right and Left can become “greatly dependent on specific and contextual constructions of “the elites” and “the people” within cultural policy dis-

course” and both offer equally convincing responses to the role of culture in the amelioration of social and economic injustice. Historically relating this to European traditions of cultural policy making. Its conceptual categories and uses of culture for democracy and society, the paper is replete with perceptive political commentary of the current employment of cultural policies by the forces of populism.

Marko Mustapić, Benjamin Perasović, and Augustin Derado’s following paper, ‘The populist 2017 electoral campaign and cultural policy: A case study of the return of ‘outcast’ Željko Kerum onto the Croatian political scene’, offers a specific case and a particularly acute critique of populism. By focussing on one populist leader in Croatia (Željko Kerum) the paper not only untangles the complex interrelation of social and economic conditions necessary for populism, but explicates the cultural basis of this political phenomenon. In all, the paper offers a rigorous example of politically-informed analysis for a new generation of cultural policy researchers. And its value is qualified by Evren Balta and Soli Özel’s larger-scale study, ‘Politics of Populism: Power and protest in the global age’. Here, the authors Balta and Özel offer a highly succinct conceptual analysis of populist phenomenon, and reveal how central it is to the crises of democracy that have erupted the world over. And even in Europe –as with Brexit– we need to understand the broader global shifts in the alignment between citizens and nation states and nation states with each other, and consider the inexorable context of a global capitalism that has so disempowered citizens in favour of the business or corporate enterprise. Yet: “So far, the established elites have been unable to find the proper strategies, language and tools, to fight against this challenge”.

The final stage of this section opens with Elona Lubyte’s ‘Maze of Choices: Art in Public Spaces Between Politics and Creative Practices’. The text is taking us back into cultural policy and management and issues central to our formation of a cultural realm in Europe – our public spaces. The focus is on Eastern Europe’s “transition from the Soviet planned economy to market-driven relations” (and particularly Lithuania), and uses the first half of the paper to unpack the complex tangle of issues in Eastern Europe’s socio-cultural transition, and then the latter

half of the paper articulates a new critical lexicon by which artists can navigate the new political landscape of public spatial dynamics. A curatorial emphasis follows, with Ana Letunić’s fascinating critique, ‘Value of Arts and Curatorial Agency in the Post-political: Condition: Creative Europe towards Economic Core Aims’. The initial emphasis of the paper on “cultural value” as a concept, and the many scholars and writers (Rancière, McGuigan, Holden, et. al.) whose work informs our understanding of this, is followed by a critical look at the EU’s Culture 2007-2013 and Creative Europe 2014-2020 programmes. As benign as EU funding seems, it embodies values as any other policy regime, and Letunić peels back the political logic of funded culture. With reference to semi-structured interviews with contemporary arts organisations in Croatia, Serbia and Poland, she identifies the implications of shifting values for the curator-administrator-artist and audience interrelations.

And we conclude with Stevan Vuković’s incisive statement ‘Art & Culture on the Battleground of Populism’. Rich in reference, both intellectual and artistic, Vuković explicates a Serbian situation with European resonance, and with critical panache comments on the post-Punk fate of the artist, critical thought and cultural autonomy, and the labouring classes as source of historical material change. Under conditions of populism, all our assumed mechanisms of social transformation are imperilled, and, consequently, a renewed intellectual project of critical reflection through intellectual solidarity and art research practice must emerge.

All these research studies contained in this “Focus” section have been specifically written for the KPY 2017 using different methodologies and approaches, all addressing problems that are in the heart of daily politics and public policies on all levels. Populist political communication has influenced not only the process of policy-making, but the values and understandings of the “use of culture” in contemporary society. Thus, these papers are not only opening debate in the sphere of theory, but opening a challenge on how cultural policies themselves have to be rethought, and to become bolder in address its own methods and aims, and further, to interrogate its own past political pragmatism facing the current global rise of populism.

Mainstreaming of Right-Wing Populism in Europe

Ayhan Kaya

Introduction

This paper aims to portray theoretical debates to better understand the current state of the populist movements and political parties in the European Union, which is hit by various kinds of social-economic and financial difficulties leading to the escalation of fear and prejudice *vis-à-vis* 'others' who are ethno-culturally and religiously different. The main premise of this paper is that the ongoing social-political-economic-financial change in the EU resulting in fear against the unknown such as Islam, Muslims, refugees and migrants is likely to be turned by individual agents into cultural/religious/civilizational reification and political radicalization in order to overcome fear. The findings of this paper derive from a qualitative fieldwork held within the framework of a Horizon 2020 Research Project called "Critical Heritages (CoHERE): performing and representing identities in Europe".¹ The fieldwork was held the research team in Dresden, Toulon, Rome, Rotterdam, Athens and Istanbul between March and May 2017. The main premise of this work in progress is to claim that pathologizing right-wing populism is not scientifically and politically productive.

1 CoHERE was launched in April 2016, and lasts until March 2019. It is run by Newcastle University, and explores the ways in which identities in Europe are constructed through heritage *representations* and *performances* that connect to ideas of place, history, tradition and belonging. The research identifies existing heritage practices and discourses in Europe. It also identifies means to sustain and transmit European heritages that are likely to contribute to the evolution of inclusive, communitarian identities and counteract disaffection with, and division within, the EU. A number of modes of representation and performance are explored in the project, from cultural policy, museum display, heritage interpretation, school curricula and political discourse to music and dance performances, food and cuisine, rituals and protest. See <https://research.ncl.ac.uk/cohere/>

Rather than being the cause of the current state of political crisis in many European Union countries, right-wing populism should be interpreted as one of the symptoms of the long-neglected structural problems augmented by neo-liberal forms of governmentality. In this regard, one of the most important claims of this paper among some others is that right-wing populism of the contemporary world is very different from its predecessor, far-right, or extreme right political parties. Today's right-wing populist parties have rather become mainstream political parties appealing to not only working-class, or unemployed social groups but also to women, LGBTI, middle-class and upper-middle-class secular groups who feel threatened by radical Salafi Islam. The paper will start with the elaboration of the contemporary acts of populism from a theoretical perspective to lay the ground for finding a set of theoretical tools to compare the six countries with regard to the growing incidence of populism. The paper will continue to elaborate on the ways in which the right-wing populist parties mainstream their movements by underlining welfare policies, Islamophobia, environmental issues, unresolved historical cleavages, critic of multiculturalism, diversity, unity and Europeanization. The use of the fieldwork data will be limited with the findings from Dresden as the rise of the *Alternativ für Deutschland* (AfD) in the general elections in Germany (September 2017) triggered the public fear against the populist threat. Due to the lack of space and time, this work in progress will not be able to go deeper to define the notions of European heritage that circulate broadly in the public sphere among the populist political parties and movements, and to investigate how the 'politics of fear' relates to these notions of European heritage and identities.

Mainstreaming of Right-Wing Populism in Europe

In 1967, researchers at the London School of Economics including Ernest Gellner, Isaiah Berlin, Alain Touraine, Peter Worsley, Kenneth Minogue, Ghita Ionescu, Franco Venturi and Hugh Seton-Watson organized a conference with a specific focus on populism. Following this pivotal conference, the proceedings were edited by Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (1969) in a rather descriptive book covering several contributions on Latin America, the USA, Russia, Eastern Europe, and Africa. One of the important outcomes of the book, which is still meaningful, was that “populism worships the people” (Ionescu and Gellner 1969: 4). However, the conference and the edited volume could not really bring about a consensus beyond this tautology, apart from adequately having displayed particularist characteristics of each populist case. One of the interesting conclusions of this path-breaking conference was very well explicated in one of Isaiah Berlin’s interventions during the conference (1967: 6):

I think we are all probably agreed that a single formula to cover all populisms everywhere will not be very helpful. The more embracing the formula, the less descriptive. The more richly descriptive the formula, the more it will exclude. The greater the intension, the smaller the extension. The greater the connotation, the smaller the denotation. This appears to me to be an almost a priori truth in historical writing.

Today, the state of play in the scientific community is not that different from the one in the late 1960s with regard to the definition of populism. Many studies have been conducted and written on the issue. But rather than having a very comprehensive definition of the term, the scholars have only come up with a list of elements defining different aspects of populism such as: anti-elitism, anti-intellectualism, and anti-establishment positions; affinity with religion and past history; racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, anti-Islam, anti-immigration; promoting the image of a socially, economically and culturally homogenous organic society; intensive use of conspiracy theories to understand the world we live in; faith in the leader’s extraordinariness as well as the belief in his/her ordinariness that brings the leader closer to the people; statism; and the sa-

cralisation of the people (Ghergina, Mişcoiu and Soare, 2013: 3-4).

In a recent article, Cas Mudde (2016a), tries to answer the following question in order to understand the rationale of the populist masses in the wake of Brexit and the rise of Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, Alternative for Germany, Five Star Movement, FIDESZ and JOBBIK in Hungary, Sweden’s Democrats, True Finns and many others: what is driving their resentment? Much of the discussion has swirled around which recent event –the Great Recession or the European refugee crisis– has done the most to fuel the rise of right-wing populism. Accordingly, a follow-up question Mudde has posed is whether the resentment is primarily economic or fundamentally cultural. His immediate answer to the second question is that neither event explains the phenomenon, which after all, predates them both. He reminds the reader that in 1999, the far-right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) received nearly 30 per cent of the national vote, and later Jean-Marie Le Pen even made it into the run-off of the presidential election in 2002. Hence, one could certainly argue that the recent economic crisis and the refugee crisis may have played a role, but they are at best catalysts, not causes. After all, if resentment as a social concept posits that losers in the competition over scarce resources respond in frustration with diffuse emotions of anger, fear and hatred, then there have been several other factors in the last three decades which may have triggered the resentment of the European public, such as de-industrialization, unemployment, growing ethno-cultural diversity, multiculturalism, terrorist attacks in the aftermath of September 11 and so on. (Berezin, 2009: 43-44).

There are various approaches to analyse typologies of populism in Europe as well as in the other parts of the world. The most common approach explains the populist vote with socio-economic factors. This approach argues that populist sentiments come out as the symptoms of detrimental effects of modernization and globalization, which is more likely to imprison working class groups in states of unemployment, marginalization and structural outsiderism through neo-liberal and post-industrial sets of policies (Betz, 2015). Accordingly, the “*losers of modernization and globalization*” respond to their exclusion and marginalization by rejecting the mainstream political parties and their discourses as well as generat-

ing a sense of ethnic competition against migrants (Fennema, 2004). The second approach tends to explain the sources of (especially right-wing) extremism and populism with reference to *ethno-nationalist sentiments rooted in myths about the distant past*. This approach claims that strengthening the nation by emphasizing a homogenous ethnicity and returning to traditional values is the only way of coming to terms with the challenges and threat coming from outside enemies be it globalization, Islam, the European Union, or the refugees (Rydgren, 2007). The third approach has a different stance with regard to the rise of populist movements and political parties. Rather than referring to the political parties and movements as a response to outside factors, this approach underlines the *strategic means* employed by populist leaders and parties to appeal to their constituents (Beauzamy, 2013). An eclectic use of these approaches is probably more reasonable to analyse the rationale behind the growing popularity of populist movements and parties. However, one could also argue that the former approach is more applicable to the West and South European context, while the second is more appropriate for the explanation of the East European populism. Since the third approach concentrates on the organizational capacity and style of the populist leaders and parties, it is probably beneficial to help us understand all sorts of contemporary populisms.

Mabel Berezin (2009) makes a different classification to explain the main analytical approaches to the new European right. He claims that there are two analytical axes on which European populisms capture their nuances: the *institutional axis*, and the *cultural axis*. In the institutional axis, their local organizational capacity, agenda setting capacity at national level, and their policy recommendation capacity, and at national level to come to terms with unemployment-related issues are of primary subjects of inquiry. In the cultural axis it is their intellectual repertoire to offer answers to the detrimental effects of globalization, their readiness to accommodate xenophobic, racist, Islamophobic discourses, and the capacity of their inventory to utilise memory, myths, past, tradition, religion, colonialism and identity. Using these two axes in analysing European populisms at present may provide the researcher with an adequate set of tools to understand the success and/or failure of local and national level. Through them, one could try to understand why and how many

populist parties in Europe become popular in particular cities, but not in the entire country, as well as the role of non-rational elements such as culture, the past (or pasts), religion and myths in the consolidation of the power of populist parties.

Right-wing populism was not a pivotal issue in Europe in the late 1960s as Ernest Gellner and others observed in the conference organized at the LSE. Even later, some extreme right-wing parties were established, but they remained marginal in everyday politics. However, today right-wing populism has been mainstreamed, and such populist parties are very different from the preceding far-right parties. It seems that right-wing populism becomes victorious at national level when its leaders are able to blend the elements of both axes, such as blending economic resentment and cultural resentment in order to create the perception of crisis. It is only when the socio-economic frustration (unemployment and poverty) is linked to cultural concerns, such as immigration and integration, that right-wing populists distinguish themselves from other critics of the economy. This is the reason why right-wing populists capitalize on culture, civilization, migration, religion and race while the left-wing populists prefer to invest in social class-related drivers. As Ernesto Laclau (2005a) noted, a situation in which a plurality of unsatisfied demands and an increasing inability of the traditional institutional system to absorb them differentially co-exist, creates the conditions leading to a populist rupture. This rupture may very well be sometimes right-wing and sometimes left-wing populism depending on the historical path each country has before taken.

Current state of politics in Europe indicates that right-wing populism has been mainstreamed. Contemporary right-wing populist parties are far from their predecessors, which were named as “far-right”, or “extreme right-wing” political parties. Marine Le Pen’s FN, Wilders’ PVV, Gauland’s AfD, or Orban’s FIDESZ are very different from the former far-right parties such as the NPD and REP in Germany, Jean-Marie Le Pen’s FN in France, or Lega Nord in Italy. The predecessors of the current right-wing populist parties were mostly marginal parties investing in racist and xenophobic political discourses, which appealed to some radicalized social groups located at the margins of the majority societies. Whereas, the current right-wing populist parties have successfully

diversified their political discourses. They are no longer simply investing in a narrow-minded racist political rhetoric, but also in *welfare policies* to remedy the immediate needs of working-class people, or unemployed groups who were negatively affected by the processes of de-industrialization, globalization, international trade, and Europeanization. They have now become catch-all parties, which could attract not only working-class men, but also women and LGBTI groups across all the social classes, a point which will be revisited shortly (Mondon and Winter, 2017; Farris, 2012). Furthermore, it is no longer a surprise to come across such right-wing populist parties with a very strong environmentalist, leftist, and critical political discourse appealing to the larger segments of the society. Another example to depict the mainstreaming of right-wing populism would be the successful incorporation of the discourse of secularism and republicanism to the party program by Marine Le Pen (Betz, 2015).

Political Imaginaries of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe

These populist parties across Europe and beyond also draw on different political imaginaries and different traditions, construct different national identity narratives, and emphasize different issues in everyday life. As Ruth Wodak (2015: 2) illustrates very well, some parties in Europe gain support by linking themselves with fascist and Nazi past as in Austria, Hungary, Italy, Romania and France. Some parties gain legitimacy through the perceived threat from Islam as in the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland. Some others endorse an Evangelical/Christian fundamentalist rhetoric as in the US. Some establish their legitimacy through Euroscepticism as in Finland and Greece. And some parties build up their legitimacy through an Islamist ideology and a perceived threat originating from unidentified enemies outside and within, such as Turkey (Kaya, 2015a). One could argue that populist parties in different national settings often follow a path-dependent lineage to choose their rhetoric and discourses to mobilize their constituents.

Regardless of the issues, European public seems to have a shared opinion about the most important challenges they are currently facing in everyday life. The Heads of State or Government of the 27 mem-

bers of the EU and the Presidents of the European Council and European Commission met in Bratislava on 29 June 2016 to diagnose the present state of the European Union and to discuss the EU-27's common future without the UK. The Bratislava meeting resulted in the 'Bratislava Declaration', which spells out the key priorities of the EU-27 for the next six months and proposes concrete measures to achieve the goals relating to: 1) migration, 2) internal and external security, and 3) economic and social development, including youth unemployment and radicalism. These topics were already outlined in advance by European Council President, Donald Tusk, and generally reflect the issues that most concern European citizens. These concerns were also revealed in the same order by the Eurobarometer Survey held in 2016.²

In a context of global economic crisis and uncertainty, the rise of neo-populist movements and Euroscepticism are two sides of the same coin. It poses the question as to whether the decrease of credibility in politics and the temptation to "overcome" the traditional parties with populist movements would be beneficial for European democracy. One of the puzzling features of populism is that it does not really fit into conventional conceptions of the left-centre-right political spectrum. For instance, in Latin America, populist movements have often been associated with the political left, which receives the strong support of the urban working class. However, in Europe, populist movements have been considered more of a right-wing phenomenon, which is often fuelled by peasant or worker support of nationalist myths and ideologies. But the distinctions are certainly not clear-cut, as left-wing populist movements may contain elements of right-wing nationalist ideology, and even European fascist and Nazi movements had distinctly socialist components in their political agendas (Howard, 2000). Nonetheless, one of the distinct elements which separate the left-wing populists from the right-wing ones is their reliance on the idea of re-educating people, an idea which originates from the socialist teachings that they grew up with. As opposed to the left-wing populists, the right-wing populists rely on the so-called *common sense* of people.

2 See European Parliamentary Research Service Blog, <https://ep-thinktank.eu/2016/10/03/outcome-of-the-informal-meeting-of-27-heads-of-state-or-government-on-16-september-2016-in-bratislava/most-important-issues-for-eu-citizens/> accessed on 4 November 2017.